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Abstract
In this paper we focus on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government quality. In a
sample of 29 developing and developed countries over the period 1984-1997, fiscal decentralization
has a positive effect on institutional quality but this effect diminishes as countries become wealthier.
Moreover, the positive effect of fiscal decentralization on government quality is reduced by electoral
and decision-making decentralization in poor and medium income countries whereas these forms of
decentralization seem to improve the impact of fiscal decentralization on government quality in rich
countries.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we empirically investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization
and government quality for a sample of twenty-nine poor and rich countries over the period
1984-1997. The quality of government is a multi-dimensional concept (La Porta et al., 1999).
Hacienda Pública Española / Revista de Economía Pública, 189-(2/2009): 131-156
© 2009, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
∗ The authors acknowledge the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda) and the Robert
Schuman Center for Advanced Studies (European University Institute) for their financial and academic support res-
pectively. Andreas Kyriacou benefited from project SEJ2007-62500 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología) while
Oriol Roca-Sagalés from projects SEJ2007-67911 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología) and 2005SGR-117 (Direc-
ció General de Recerca). They also thank Daniel Treisman for sharing his data on decentralization with them. Last
but not least, they thank Miquel Carreras, Julián Messina, Xavier Ramos and two anonymous referees for helpful
comments on previous versions. All remaining errors are of course entirely due to the authors.In general, government quality improves if the public sector does not distort the proper func-
tioning of the private sector (respects property rights, does not over-regulate), is an efficient
administrator (low corruption, less bureaucracy, high tax compliance), provides public goods
(education, health, infrastructures, etc.) and, finally, allows for and protects political freedom.
A good number of empirical studies have pointed to the importance of good government
for economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemo-
glu et al., 2001; Salinas and Salinas, 2007). But the quality of government has itself been the
object of analysis in an effort to understand why some countries have better governments
than others. In this context, La Porta et al. (1999) point to the importance of economic, po-
litical and cultural factors in explaining international differences in government quality.
More recently, Adserà et al. (2003) and Persson et al. (2003) have shown the importance for
government quality of periodic elections, a well informed electorate and well designed elec-
toral rules1.
Another factor which may determine variation in government quality is the degree of
fiscal decentralization. As is explained in section 2 below, the theoretical literature pro-
vides arguments both for and against decentralizing fiscally in an effort to contribute to-
wards better government. Similarly, the empirical studies that have examined the effect
of fiscal decentralization on government quality have not clearly established the sign and
significance of this relationship as is explained in section 3. This study will add to this
empirical literature by estimating the impact of fiscal decentralization on government
quality based on a panel of countries. It improves on previous studies which are mostly
cross-section based not least because it increases the sample size and thus improves the
precision of the estimates. Moreover, and as discussed in section 4, the use of fixed ef-
fects estimation corrects one serious problem affecting previous cross-section estimates
namely, omitted variable bias.
The results obtained, discussed in sections 5 and 6, point to a positive relationship bet-
ween fiscal decentralization and government quality in the case of poor to medium income
countries. Another notable finding which emerges from the analysis is the impact of politi-
cal decentralization on this relationship. Political decentralization erodes the positive effect
of fiscal decentralization on government quality in poor countries while it seems to improve
its impact on the quality of government in rich countries.
2. Theoretical priors
There are several theoretical arguments why decentralization may improve government
quality. First, decentralized government will be better informed about local conditions and
so can better satisfy citizen preferences (Oates, 1972). Second, citizens themselves may be
better informed about local government activity and, assuming that local politicians are lo-
cally elected rather than centrally appointed, good (or bad) performance in such a setting can
be directly rewarded (or punished) (Seabright, 1996; Tabellini, 2000).
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petition, we would expect locally elected governments to offer public goods more efficiently
(responsive to local demands and at lower cost) and also to be less corrupt since economic
agents would flee more corrupt regions (Hirschman, 1970; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980;
Weingast, 1995; Montinola et al., 1995). The capacity of economic agents to choose among
regulatory regimes in a competitive setting will tend to drive down the degree of corruption
whereas corruption is likely to increase in a setting characterized by numerous public mono-
polies all of which must be satisfied to undertake any particular economic activity (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993). In a competitive setting, voters can use the performance of each jurisdic-
tion as a benchmark and this should increase efficiency in public good supply (Salmon,
1987; Breton, 1996).
The inter-jurisdictional competition literature emphasizes the importance of tying local
revenues to expenditures for the proper functioning of competition since vertical transfers
may create incentives for local officials to ignore competitive pressures for better manage-
ment (Oates, 1999; Fisman and Gatti, 2002a). Similarly, in the context of revenue sharing
schemes, assigning local government a greater share of revenue from locally-originating taxes
may lead them to limit costly regulations and corruption as well as provide public goods more
efficiently since these reduce economic activity and thus eventually reduce its tax base (Zhu-
ravksaya, 2000; Jin et al., 2005). More generally, sub-central governments will tend to be
more inefficient if they face soft rather than hard budget constraints, or, in other words, if they
can count on the central government for future bail-outs (Qian and Rolands, 1998).
On the other hand, several arguments have been made explaining why fiscal decentrali-
zation may deteriorate government quality. For example, if capital is too mobile, local go-
vernments may not be able to collect sufficient taxes to provide basic public goods (Keen
and Marchand, 1997; Oates, 1999). Further, locally elected governments may indulge in
rent-seeking behaviour if more immobile factors such as farmers, workers or consumers are
more numerous than mobile ones such as investors (Rodden and Rose-Ackerman, 1997).
Moreover, the benign effects of competition depend on the assumption that sub-central
jurisdictions are homogeneous with regard to their factor productivity. If they are heteroge-
neous, competition may mean the outflow of capital from less endowed regions leading go-
vernments in these regions to give up on business-friendly policies and to dedicate themsel-
ves to predation instead (Cai and Treisman, 2005). In addition, local governments may also
compete for capital by helping agents cheat the central government in ways that reduce the
latter’s capacity to enforce regulations and collect taxes (Cai and Treisman, 2004). Also, al-
though assigning local governments a greater share of revenue may improve their incenti-
ves, it may at the same time weaken the incentives of central government by reducing its
stake in economic development since its share of locally generated revenues is reduced
(Treisman, 2006). 
Additionally, more decentralized polities may involve duplication and thus a waste of re-
sources (Rousseau, 1762). Moreover, local officials are more susceptible to corruption than cen-
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the part of local governments (Tanzi, 1995; Prud’homme, 1995), because national office being
more prestigious and powerful it will be more intensely monitored (Prud’homme, 1995; Tabe-
llini, 2000) or because local officials are more susceptible to capture by local economic interests
partly because voters are more uninformed due to lower media attention and because interest
groups find it easier to overcome free-rider problems (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000).
In this vein, Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) suggest the need for a degree of political cen-
tralization –such as for example the right of central government to appoint or fire regional
governors or the creation of national parties exercising influence on regionally elected go-
vernors– so as to deal with the possibility of capture. Alternatively, the combination of
strong national parties and elected rather than appointed sub-central government politicians
makes them sensitive to national and local preferences respectively and is thereby likely to
improve the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization (Riker, 1964; Enikolopov and Zhuravs-
kaya, 2007).
3. Empirical priors
Most empirical studies on the impact of decentralization have focused on one aspect of
government quality namely, corruption. Thus, De Mello and Barenstein (2001) control for
GDP per capita and population and find that more fiscally decentralized countries tend to be
less corrupt. Fisman and Gatti (2002b) find a similar relationship but controlling for more
factors (GDP per capita, civil liberties, population and government share of expenditure or
share of GDP). They moreover find that when fiscal decentralization is considered then whe-
ther a country is federal or not has no effect on corruption. Treisman (2002a) finds that if
one includes a control for the percentage of Protestants in the population in Fisman and Gat-
ti’s estimations, the negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption di-
sappears - he finds no statistically significant relationship between fiscal decentralization
and corruption. All these empirical studies calibrate the impact of fiscal decentralization on
corruption based on cross-section analyses2.
Several empirical studies have gone beyond corruption to consider other aspects of go-
vernment quality in order to investigate the importance of fiscal decentralization. Estache and
Sinha (1995) calibrate the effect of expenditure decentralization on infrastructure provision in
a panel of both developing and developed countries. They find that decentralization is related
to more infrastructure spending in sub-central levels in developing countries and, to a lesser ex-
tent, in developed ones. Robalino et al. (2001) also use panel data and find that more fiscally
decentralized countries (again expenditure decentralization) have lower mortality rates. In ano-
ther study, Khaleghian (2003) shows that fiscal decentralization (measured in terms of both a
binary variable and as expenditure and revenues in the hands of sub-central governments) is
related to higher immunization coverage in a panel of low and middle-income countries. In a
cross-section study, Treisman (2002a) finds expenditure decentralization ambiguously related
to public good provision (positively with infrastructure and negatively with health and educa-
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sition countries and find that fiscal decentralization combined with strong national parties sig-
nificantly improves government measured in terms of a series of governance indicators (go-
vernment efficiency, regulatory quality, control of corruption and rule of law), and in terms of
public good provision (health and education outcomes). In the case of public good provision,
they support their cross-section results with panel regression.
Defining government quality more widely, Huther and Shah (1998) find that fiscal de-
centralization is associated with enhanced quality of government as measured by citizen par-
ticipation, political and democratic accountability, social justice, improved economic mana-
gement and reduced corruption. However, their study suffers from omitted variable bias
since they only provide simple correlations among these variables.
Finally, based on both cross-section and panel data of low and high income countries,
Dreher (2006) estimates the relationship between expenditure and revenue decentralization
and quality of government measured as respect of law and order, the cost of opening up a
new business and judicial independence while controlling for GDP, population and civil li-
berties. He finds that law and order is more likely with a higher share of sub-national reve-
nues for the full sample and low income countries but not for high income countries. The
same happens with the cost of starting a business. Judicial independence increases with sub-
national revenue or expenditure share for both high income countries and the full sample. 
In this paper we estimate the impact of fiscal decentralization on government quality
more widely defined based on panel data. As will be more fully explained in the following
section, our definition of government quality is wider than that used by Dreher (2006) since
it goes beyond law and order to include corruption and bureaucratic quality. Our definition
of government quality, together with our sample of both poor and rich countries moreover
extends Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) who limited their panel regression to explain
public good provision in a sample of developing and transition countries. We reduce the risk
of possible omitted variable bias present in previous studies by including more time-variant
control variables as suggested by the literature as well as several interaction terms. In addi-
tion, we correct our estimates both for serial autocorrelation and cross-section heteroscedas-
ticity to avoid overestimating the significance of our explanatory variables.
4. Data and empirical methodology
In this section we review how both fiscal decentralization and quality of government have
been measured in empirical work with a view to identifying the strengths and weakness of the
available data. We moreover introduce the empirical methodology which is employed in the fo-
llowing section and review the set of control variables which have been used in related empiri-
cal literature examining the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government quality.
The indicator of government quality employed in this paper comes from the Internatio-
nal Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as developed by the Political Risk Services Group since the
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countries. The index is based on the analysis of a worldwide network of experts, and is sub-
ject to a peer review process to ensure the coherence and comparability across countries. Dif-
ferent variables from the ICRG data have been used to measure the determinants of govern-
ment quality since La Porta’s et al. (1999) seminal piece on the subject. We focus on three
dimensions from this source namely corruption, rule of law and bureaucratic quality. Co-
rruption refers to the demand for bribes by political and administrative bodies as well as pa-
tronage, nepotism, job reservation, ‘favors-for-favors’, etc. The variable law and order as-
sesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system as well as popular observance of the
law. Bureaucratic quality refers to the strength, expertise, autonomy and recruitment and
training mechanism of the civil service. The quality of government indicator used here is the
average of these three dimensions and is scaled from 0 to 1 where a higher number implies
higher government quality. Averaging the dimensions has the advantage of reducing the in-
fluence of idiosyncratic ratings stemming from any one dimension. On the negative side ho-
wever, it does not allow us to separate the effect of each dimension.
Fiscal decentralization refers to the distribution of tax revenues and expenditures among
the different tiers of government. A system is more fiscally decentralized the greater the pro-
portion of tax-revenues and expenditures “owned” by lower tiers of government. The most
widely used measure of fiscal decentralization in the literature is provided by the IMF’s Go-
vernment Finance Statistics (GFS) and refers to expenditure or revenue share of sub-central
governments in total public expenditures or revenues (Expshare and Revshare) or as a pro-
portion of GDP (ExpGDP and RevGDP). But these general definitions are problematic in
that they do not reflect whether sub-central governments own these resources (Ebel and Yil-
maz, 2002; Rodden, 2004; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2006). Thus, expenditures that
are mandated by the central government appear as sub-national expenditures in the GFS
while revenues received from grants by the central government appear as sub-central reve-
nues regardless of whether they are conditional or unconditional. As a result, expenditure
and revenue accruing to sub-central levels of government will tend to overestimate the de-
gree of fiscal decentralization (World Bank, 2004)3. Despite their shortcoming, these indi-
cators are available for the widest coverage of countries and time periods and it is for this re-
ason that we too employ them in this paper. They give rise to a balanced panel of 29
countries for the period 1984 to 1997 (see appendix 1 for the list of countries).
The GFS also contain data on other fiscal decentralization variables but with an even more
limited cross-section and temporal availability. One line of data refers to vertical imbalance
(VIM) or the degree to which sub-national governments rely on central government transfers to
support their expenditures (measured as intergovernmental transfers as a share of sub-national
expenditures). Another calculates transfers share as transfers to sub-central governments as a
share of total sub-national revenues and grants (Trashare). However, these measures do not dis-
tinguish what proportion of transfers is conditional versus general purpose. The GFS also con-
tain information about sub-national tax and non-tax revenues. For example, tax share measures
sub-national tax revenue as a percentage of total sub-national revenues (Taxshare). But it does
not distinguish whether they are collected through shared taxes, piggybacked taxes, and locally
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vernment has the power to set the rate and the base, leaving sub-national governments just to
collect revenues labeled as own-source (Rodden, 2004). The OECD (1999) tackles these data
problems for OECD countries generating an analytical classification of sub-central taxes accor-
ding to the degree of discretion of sub-central government. Based on this classification, Stega-
rescu (2006) generates several indicators of decentralization across 23 OECD countries for the
period 1965-2001 including a measure of tax decentralization which refers to sub-central go-
vernment tax revenue –on which the sub-central government determines the tax rate and/or
base– as a proportion of total government tax revenue taxes (Taxdec)4.
The just mentioned variables are available for the 15 high income countries from our
total sample of 29 countries. As can be appreciated in the correlation matrix in table 1 below
there are four variables which are closely correlated namely, ExpGDP, Expshare, RevGDP
and Revshare. Stegarescu’s Taxdec measure is also closely correlated to the IMF statistics
on the revenue side but less so on the expenditure side as we would expect.
Another highly correlated pair of fiscal decentralization indicators are VIM and Trasha-
re which is not surprising since they both capture sub-central government dependence on
central transfers on the expenditure and revenue sides respectively. Both these variables are
moreover highly negatively correlated with Taxshare which again is what we would expect
since it is the negative image of these two variables – it captures tax-autonomy whereas they
capture the tax-dependence of the sub-central governments. These three variables are less
correlated with Taxdec as well as Revshare and RevGDP and much less correlated with the
general expenditure variables offered by the IMF.
Table 1
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES.
DECENTRALIZATION VARIABLES
ExpGDP EspShare RevGDP Revshare Taxdec Taxshare Trashare VIM
ExpGDP 1.0000 0.8812 0.8762 0.7640 0.6518 0.2548 –0.2571 –0.2568
Expshare 0.8812 1.0000 0.8523 0.9143 0.7113 0.3074 –0.3843 –0.3796
RevGDP 0.8762 0.8523 1.0000 0.9182 0.8181 0.6315 –0.6571 –0.6501
Revshare 0.7640 0.9143 0.9182 1.0000 0.8251 0.5963 –0.6754 –0.6668
Taxdec. 0.6518 0.7113 0.8181 0.8251 1.0000 0.6447 –0.6197 –0.6200
Taxshare 0.2548 0.3074 0.6315 0.5963 0.6447 1.0000 –0.9183 –0.9471
Trasshare –0.2571 –0.3843 –0.6571 –0.6754 –0.6197 –0.9183 1.0000 0.9869
VIM –0.2568 –0.3796 –0.6501 –0.6668 –0.6200 –0.9471 0.9869 1.0000
All correlations are statiscally significant at the 1% level.
Our empirical strategy is based on fixed effects estimation for panel data. Bringing
fixed effects estimation to bear on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and go-
vernment quality has one important advantage over previous cross-section estimations ex-
ploring this relationship namely, the ability to control for cross-country heterogeneity due
to time constant (or slowly changing) observable or unobserved factors (cross-section fixed
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tion units (period fixed effects). Time constant factors include many variables which have
been typically employed in cross-section analyses of the determinants of quality of govern-
ment such as ethno-linguistic fractionalization, legal origin, religion, latitude, country area
and continental or regional dummies. Given the possibility that these variables, and other
non-observable ones, may be related to both fiscal decentralization and government quality,
their exclusion would induce omitted variable bias, affecting both the estimated impact of
decentralization and its statistical significance.
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) identify this form of bias as one of the important metho-
dological problems with existing cross-section studies estimating the effect of decentralization
on governance. The use of random effects estimation would not allow us to deal with omitted
variable bias in a similarly satisfactory manner. Moreover, since our cross-section units are not
exchangeable, it is not appropriate to treat our sample as if it were a random sample from a large
population as would be implied by the use of random effects estimation (Hsiao, 2003). Not-
withstanding these theoretical reasons for favoring fixed effects estimation, we perform a Haus-
man test comparing the random effects and fixed effects estimators. This test is based on the
difference between the coefficient estimates from both the random and fixed effects estimators
(Wooldridge, 2002). A statistically significant difference is interpreted as evidence against the
random effects assumption of no correlation between the unobserved explanatory variables and
the unobserved factors, and just such a significant difference is what we obtain5.
Our fixed effect estimation then reduces the likelihood of omitted variable bias since it
eliminates the possible influence coming from both observable and unobservable time cons-
tant variables. What fixed effects estimation does not control for are time variant omitted va-
riables affecting government quality and fiscal decentralization. As a result, and in tune with
the research in this area using both cross-section and panel data, we include the following
time variant control variables (available in our sample of countries) in our regressions: real
GDP per capita, democracy, size of government, population, and checks and balances (see
appendix 2 for descriptions and sources of all the variables and appendix 3 for standard sum-
mary statistics). We therefore estimate the following equation:
Government Qualityit = αi + γt + β1 Fiscal Decentralizationit + β2Xit + εit (1)
where i refers to countries and t to years, αi and γt are country and period fixed effects res-
pectively, Xit is the vector of control variables and εit is the error term.
The related literature alerts us to the problem of endogeneity in the sense that govern-
ment quality may be affected by decentralization but decentralization may also be influen-
ced by the quality of government (see, for example, Fisman and Gatti, 2002b and Treisman,
2002a). Similar arguments have been made for other economic variables used to explain
government quality (La Porta et al., 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001) or fiscal decentralization
(Panizza, 1999). The presence of endogeneity has generally been dealt with, in both cross-
section and panel analyses, through the use of instrumental variables. We follow Enikolo-
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lagged one period and estimating via two-stage least squares, to mitigate problems stem-
ming from possible reverse causality in the panel regressions. The equation to be estimated
therefore becomes:
Government Qualityit = αi + γt + β1Fiscal Decentralizationi(t-1) + β2Zi(t-1) + β3Xit + εit (2)
where i refers to countries and t to years, αi and γt are country and period fixed effects res-
pectively, Zit is the vector of endogenous variables, Xit is the vector of exogenous variables
and εit is the error term.
Richer countries tend to be more decentralized (Panizza, 1999; World Bank, 2004)
and have better government quality since economic development makes better quality ins-
titutions more affordable (Islam and Montenegro, 2002) and will tend to create a demand
for better government (La Porta, et al., 1999) perhaps because of income’s positive effect
on education, literacy and depersonalized relationships (Treisman, 2000). Democracy is
positively correlated with decentralization (Panizza, 1999; Treisman, 2002b) and is likely
to be negatively related to corruption since it makes politicians more accountable (Adserà
et al., 2003).
Treisman (2002a) takes population to be an indicator for country size and expects larger
(more populous) countries to be more decentralized but also to have lower government qua-
lity – small states are easier to govern. Mello and Barenstein (2001) suggest that more po-
pulous countries may be more heterogeneous. This being the case, we would expect popula-
tion (as a proxy of heterogeneity) to be positively related to decentralization (Panizza, 1999)
and negatively related to quality of government (La Porta et al., 1999).
More decentralized countries are likely to have more checks and balances. Checks and
balances in the political decision-making process could stabilize good institutions but by loc-
king in the status quo they may just as much impede reforms, including those which may im-
prove the quality of government (Treisman, 2002a).
All other things equal, one would expect a larger public sector to be relatively more de-
centralized. Moreover, Tanzi (1998) expects a bigger state sector to imply greater corruption
due to the greater possibility for rents. On the other hand, Fisman and Gatti (2002a) expect
a larger government to enjoy economies of scale in the fight against corruption. Similarly,
the effect of a larger state sector on the rule of law and bureaucratic quality is arguably po-
sitive insofar as more resources improve the capacity of government to provide such servi-
ces. In relation to this, higher civil service pay has also been found to reduce bureaucratic
corruption (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).
Consistent with previous literature then, we would expect a positive effect on govern-
ment quality coming from income and democracy, a negative effect coming from population
while that of government size and checks and balances is more ambiguous.
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The variables included in the regressions reported in this section are those which are
mostly statistically significant or whose exclusion seriously changes the results. This means
that several variables previously discussed namely, democracy, checks and balances and
population are not included because they are not significant and their absence has no bea-
ring on the results. This is despite using several indicators of democracy available (see ap-
pendix 2). Especially in the case of democracy and checks and balances, their irrelevance
may be due to the limited variation through time for the sample of countries that we exa-
mine here. In the tables that follow, the size of government is positively related with the
quality of government and this relationship tends to be statistically significant for the sam-
ple of high income countries.
Testing for the presence of endogeneity in equation 1, we fail to reject the null hypothe-
sis of exogeneity of fiscal decentralization, GDP per capita and government size (see Haus-
man, 1978 and Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, in the tables that follow, these variables are
instrumented through their one-period-lagged values.
Moreover, we test the joint significance of period and country fixed effects and the re-
sults unambiguously indicate the convenience of including these effects or, in other words,
of using a two-way fixed effects model. Our base regression therefore becomes,
Gov. Qualityit = αi + γt + β1Fiscal Decentralizationi(t-1) + β2GDPi(t-1) +β3Size Gov.i(t-1) + εit (3)
where i refers to countries and t to years, αi and γt are country and period fixed effects res-
pectively and εit is the error term.
We perform an analog of the Breusch-Pagan test adapted for two-stage least squares to
examine the presence of heteroscedasticity and reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasti-
city (Wooldridge, 2006). We further test for serial correlation after two-stage least squares
and reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. We correct standard errors, allowing for
both arbitrary period serial correlation and period heteroskedasticity between the residuals
for a given cross-section and estimating via Feasible Generalized Least Squares.
Moreover, in order to fathom whether the first order autocorrelation we detect seriously
alters the statistical significance of our findings, we also undertake regressions where we eli-
minate this autocorrelation by way of taking four year averages. Doing so, also allows us to
deal with the possibility that yearly changes in fiscal decentralization may not affect year to
year changes in government quality (see, Davoodi and Zoo, 1998 for a similar approach). In
addition, by eliminating autocorrelation, we can go some way towards addressing likely
drawbacks in our instruments; using lagged independent variables as instruments in the pre-
sence of serial correlation violates the requirement of exogeneity for valid instruments (Are-
llano, 2002). We allow for cross-section heteroskedasticity in these autocorrelation-free re-
gressions by reporting White cross-section corrected standard errors.
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centralization in terms of expenditure and revenue shares of sub-central governments in total
government expenditure and revenues respectively. On the expenditure side fiscal decentrali-
zation has a positive and statistically significant effect on government quality (regression 1).
The direction and statistical significance of this relationship is reinforced in the regression ta-
king four year averages of the variables as a way of dealing with the first-order autocorrela-
tion process detected (regression 2).
The impact of fiscal decentralization on government quality is strongly affected by the
inclusion of two time constant dummy variables capturing political institutions as suggested
by Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007). The “elections” dummy takes the value of 0 if nei-
ther the regional executive nor the regional legislature are locally elected and 1 if either are
elected. The “autonomy” dummy takes the value of 1 when subnational governments are
granted residual powers in the constitution and/or they have autonomy in certain specified
areas not explicitly subject to central laws. When we interact this variable with fiscal decen-
tralization it turns out that if regional governments or legislatures are elected rather than ap-
pointed (regression 3) or if the constitution grants sub-national regions residual powers or
autonomy in certain areas (regression 4), then the positive impact of fiscal decentralization
on government quality would be neutralized for the complete sample6.
Table 2
GOVERNMENT QUALITY REGRESSED ON EXPENDITURE DECENTRALIZATION
(EXPENDITURE SHARE, WHOLE SAMPLE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Means Means
Decentralization 0.295 0.523 0.728 0.618 3.331 3.633 3.367 3.197
(0.16)* (0.19)*** (0.20)** (0.16)*** (1.30)** (0.50)*** (1.19)*** (1.20)***
GDP per capita 0.109 0.171 0.022 0.010 1.017 1.111 0.841 0.820
(0.32) (0.23) (0.30) (0.29) (0.49)** (0.36)*** (0.46)* (0.47)*
Size Government 0.162 0.105 0.162 0.117 0.248 0.144 0.238 0.201
(0.24) (0.09) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.08)* (0.21) (0.21)
GPD per capita* –0.352 –0.374 –0.313 –0.306





Adjusted R2 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.87
Observations 377 87 377 377 377 87 377 377
Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** measures statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
All continuous variables are in logarithms. All independent variables are instrumented through their values lagged
one period. “Means” implies using 4 year averages for all variables. “Elections” and “Autonomy” are time constant
dummy variables. All regressions include cross-section and period fixed effects. Regressions 2 and 6 report White
cross-section standard errors. All remaining regressions report standard errors allowing for both arbitrary period se-
rial correlation and period heteroskedasticity between the residuals for a given cross-section and estimating via fea-
sible Generalized Least Squares.
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term between fiscal decentralization and income so as to capture possible differences in per-
formance between rich and poor countries. As a result, we find that the positive effect of fis-
cal decentralization on government quality is true for poor to medium income countries but
not for high income countries as can be seen in regressions 5 to 8. The interaction term is ne-
gative and statistically significant and yields a turning point for the base regression (5) of
$12,875. The negative impact of political decentralization on the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and government quality also appears.
Table 3
GOVERNMENT QUALITY REGRESSED ON REVENUE DECENTRALIZATION
(REVENUE SHARE, WHOLE SAMPLE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Means Means
Decentralization 0.121 0.571 0.457 0.210 3.298 4.139 3.204 3.273
(0.12) (0.25)** (0.18)** (0.15 (1.02)*** (0.80)*** (1.00)*** (1.01)***
GDP per capita 0.075 0.075 0.053 0.042 0.747 0.809 0.673 0.718
(0.33) (0.23) (0.31) (0.33) (0.36)** (0.34)** (0.35)* (0.36)**
Size Government 0.174 0.050 0.169 0.169 0.273 0.146 0.261 0.269
(0.25) (0.13) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.09) (0.21) (0.21)
GPD per capita* –0.361 –0.410 –0.328 –0.353





Adjusted R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Observations 377 87 377 377 377 87 377 377
Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** measures statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
All continuous variables are in logarithms. All independent variables are instrumented through their values lagged
one period. “Means” implies using 4 year averages for all variables. “Elections” and “Autonomy” are time constant
dummy variables. All regressions include cross-section and period fixed effects. Regressions 2 and 6 report White
cross-section standard errors. All remaining regressions report standard errors allowing for both arbitrary period se-
rial correlation and period heteroskedasticity between the residuals for a given cross-section and estimating via fea-
sible Generalized Least Squares.
These results are confirmed when using revenue share as our measure of fiscal decen-
tralization (table 3) although their statistical significance is reduced with this measure in
those regressions which exclude the interaction between fiscal decentralization and GDP per
capita. The turning point of the effect of GDP on the relationship between fiscal decentrali-
zation and government quality is now $9,281 for the base regression (5). Again, political de-
centralization seems to have a negative effect on the relationship between government qua-
lity and fiscal decentralization.
Since we detect that the impact of fiscal decentralization on government quality differs
between richer and poorer countries, we split the sample between low to medium income and
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reports the results for a group of 14 low and medium income countries. We confirm the po-
sitive relationship between fiscal decentralization and the quality of government, especially
on the expenditure side. However, the negative effect of electoral decentralization or deci-
sion-making decentralization (regional autonomy) on this relationship is also observed. In-
deed, in the presence of political decentralization the positive relationship between fiscal de-
centralization and government quality becomes a negative one. Thus, the result whereby
fiscal decentralization positively affects government quality in poorer countries can only be
affirmed in the absence of political decentralization.
Table 4
GOVERNMENT QUALITY REGRESSED ON EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE
DECENTRALIZATION (LOW AND MEDIUM INCOME COUNTRIES)
Expenditure Share Revenue Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decentralization 0.196 0.723 0.585 1.121 0.550 0.286
(0.23) (0.26)*** (0.22)*** (0.15) (0.24)** (0.19)
GDP per capita 0.042 –0.090 –0.095 –0.010 –0.032 –0.079
(0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.49) (0.43) (0.47)
Size Government 0.233 0.225 0.167 0.245 0.220 0.235





Adjusted R2 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.75 0.78 0.77
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182
Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** measures statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respective-
ly. All continuous variables are in logarithms. All independent variables are instrumented through their values
lagged one period. “Elections” and “Autonomy” are time constant dummy variables. All regressions include cross-
section and period fixed effects and report standard errors allowing for both arbitrary period serial correlation and
period heteroskedasticity between the residuals for a given cross-section and estimating via feasible Generalized
Least Squares.
Turning now to the group of 15 high income countries (table 5), the positive relations-
hip between government quality and fiscal decentralization disappears. In fact, the direction
of this relationship is reversed: more fiscal decentralization reduces government quality in
this sample. Interestingly, this negative impact is again altered in the presence of electoral or
decision-making decentralization. In rich countries, electoral decentralization mitigates the
negative impact of fiscal decentralization while decision-making decentralization may even
make this impact a positive one. But all these statements must be immediately qualified since
our decentralization variables are neither statistically significant nor are they economically
significant compared to their previous values (their impact is reduced by a factor of 10). It
seems therefore that the best we can do with the available data is to state that fiscal decen-
tralization does not seem to have a significant effect on government quality in high income
countries. 
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GOVERNMENT QUALITY REGRESSED ON EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE
DECENTRALIZATION (HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES)
Expenditure Share Revenue Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decentralization 0.023 –0.033 –0.058 –0.030 –0.058 –0.051
(0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04)
GDP per capita 0.400 0.388 0.369 0.421 0.419 0.384
(0.14)*** (0.14)*** (0.13)*** (0.12)*** (0.12)*** (0.12)***
Size Government 0.177 0.158 0.137 0.213 0.208 0.184





Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195
Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** measures statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respective-
ly. All continuous variables are in logarithms. All independent variables are instrumented through their values
lagged one period. “Elections” and “Autonomy” are time constant dummy variables. All regressions include cross-
section and period fixed effects and report standard errors allowing for both arbitrary period serial correlation and
period heteroskedasticity between the residuals for a given cross-section and estimating via feasible Generalized
Least Squares.
In the case of the rich countries it is possible to check the robustness of the obtained re-
sults using the different measures of decentralization available. In table 6, we regress the go-
vernment quality measure on GDP per capita and the size of government while varying the
fiscal decentralization indicator. We start with the wider IMF measure (but now spending or
expenditure as a percentage of GDP to complement previous results), going through the
IMF’s measure of tax autonomy followed by its measures of transfer dependence and ending
with the OECD measure of tax decentralization taken from Stegarescu (2006) which ar-
guably goes some way towards correcting the over-estimation of decentralization attributed
to the IMF measures. 
The results tend to follow those obtained using expenditure and revenue share. There is
a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and government quality (as before the
relationship is positive if the expenditure side is the measure used). But this negative impact
is both statistically and perhaps more importantly, economically close to zero, less so when
tax share is the measure used but much more so when the OECD measure is employed.
Again, it seems, fiscal decentralization has little if any impact on government quality in rich
countries.
Before closing here it is worth pointing out that several other variables were included
but not found to be statistically significant, nor did they appreciably change the results.
Thus, we interacted fiscal decentralization with two measures of party strength as sugges-
ted by Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) namely, party age and legislative fractionali-
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gression results. The squared value of decentralization was also included to check for a
quadratic relationship between it and government quality but again nothing changed. Fi-
nally, in order to fathom whether the results are being driven by one particular country in
our sample, we repeated our regressions after removing each of the 29 countries one at a
time for the whole sample as well as each of the 15 and 14 high and low to medium inco-
me countries for their respective samples. The results are stable indicating that no single
country is driving our results.
Table 6
GOVERNMENT QUALITY REGRESSED ON DIFFERENT FISCAL
DECENTRALIZATION MEASURES (HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES)
GFS Decentralization measures OECD
Decentralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ExpGDP RevGDP Taxshare Trashare VIM Taxdec
Decentralization 0.031 –0.033 –0.040 0.027 0.028 –0.007
(0.06) (0.04) (0.02)* (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
GDP per capita 0.399 0.419 0.375 0.405 0.405 0.420
(0.12)*** (0.12)*** (0.11)** (0.12)*** (0.12)*** (0.12)***
Size Government 0.147 0.229 0.215 0.175 0.179 0.197
(0.15) (0.12)** (0.11)** (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)*
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195
Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** measures statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
All continuous variables are in logarithms. All independent variables are instrumented through their values lagged
one period. All regressions include cross-section and period fixed effects and report standard errors allowing for
both arbitrary period serial correlation and period heteroskedasticity between the residuals for a given cross-section
and estimating via feasible Generalized Least Squares.
6. Discussion
One significant finding in our study is the importance of electoral and decision-ma-
king decentralization on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government
quality. In a cross section study and using measures of electoral and decision-making de-
centralization, Treisman (2002a) finds no statistically significant effect between these va-
riables and corruption7. Interacting these variables with fiscal decentralization (subnatio-
nal  expenditure  share)  did  not  change  his  results.  Alternatively,  Enikolopov  and
Zhuravskaya (2007) do find a positive effect on the relationship between fiscal decentra-
lization and public good provision (health and education) coming from electoral decentra-
lization.
Measuring government quality based on corruption, law and order and bureaucratic
quality, we find that both electoral and decision-making decentralization autonomy have
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ment quality in poor countries. It may be that sub-national political institutions in poo-
rer countries are under-developed compared to those in wealthy countries, and as a re-
sult,  they  are  unable  to  harness  the  positive  effects  expected  from  electoral  and
decision-making decentralization. Indeed, less developed political institutions may con-
vert the virtues expected from these forms of decentralization into vices. This echoes
Shah’s (2006) concern that sub-national governments in developing countries may be
more susceptible to capture by local economic interests as well as Bardhan’s (2002)
warning that electoral decentralization in democratically immature countries may not
work as expected.
The differential effect of political institutions in rich and poor countries is interesting
because it is related to another notable finding from our research namely, that the marginal
benefits of fiscal decentralization vis-à-vis government quality diminish as GDP per capita
increases. This finding parallels those of Robalino et al. (2001) and Khalegian (2003) in re-
lation to health and education outcomes and is very similar to Dreher’s (2006) result –
based on both a cross-section and panel analysis – such that revenue decentralization posi-
tively and significantly affects law and order in a sample of poor countries but that this re-
lationship becomes negative and insignificant in a sample of rich countries. Our results for
rich countries are robust to the use of several different measures of fiscal decentralization
including the OECD’s measure of tax decentralization which goes some way towards co-
rrecting for the over-estimation of fiscal decentralization in the IMF’s Government Finan-
ce Statistics.
It could be that the results obtained for poor countries may be driven by our use of the GFS
measures of fiscal decentralization but since the more precise OECD-type data is not available
for these countries we cannot pursue this possibility8. Or it could be, as Robalino et al. (2001)
suggest, that the problems associated with centralized systems diminish as economic develop-
ment takes place. If, for some reason, central institutions in rich countries are better able to pro-
vide government quality as we define it here, then this would explain the insignificant impact
(both economic and statistical) of fiscal decentralization in our rich country sample. This said,
our analysis points to an alternative explanation namely the importance of political institutions
in the guise of electoral and decision-making decentralization. When these institutions are con-
sidered, the positive effect of fiscal decentralization on government quality in poor countries is
neutralized while the effect in rich countries is positively reinforced. Again, the political insti-
tutions at the sub-national level may be less developed in poorer countries.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have focused on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
government quality. In a sample of 29 poor, medium income and rich countries over the
period 1984-1997, fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on institutional quality but
this effect diminishes as countries become wealthier. Moreover, the positive effect of fis-
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decentralization in poor and medium income countries whereas these forms of decentrali-
zation seem to improve the impact of fiscal decentralization on government quality in rich
countries.
Before closing here it’s worth noting that governments may decentralize for different re-
asons (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). Western countries mainly decentralize in order to provide
public services in a more cost-effective way, whereas low income countries pursue decen-
tralization as a way to overcome macroeconomic instability and ineffective governance.
Throughout post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, decentralization is intimately lin-
ked to the transition from a socialist system to a market economy and democracy. In Latin
America, the origin of decentralization is the political pressure from the people for democra-
tization. All over the world, decentralization may be an important instrument for diffusing
secessionist tendencies (World Development Report, 1999/2000). Our study points out that,
on average, developing countries which are fiscally decentralized but politically centralized
may have better quality governments. But any policy prescriptions flowing from these re-
sults must take into consideration the particular circumstances of the country in question and
the wider motives for undertaking decentralization in the first place.
Notas
1. See Aixalà and Fabro (2008) for a cross-section analysis of the determinants of government quality as well as
Aixalà and Fabro (2007) for a review of the literature of the impact of government quality on economic
growth.
2. For a survey of the causes and consequences of corruption see Lambsdorff (2006). For a review of some of
the theoretical and empirical literature on the relation between decentralization and corruption see Bardhan
and Mookherjee (2006).
3. Rodden (2004) points out that in the GFS data Denmark comes out the 3rd most decentralized country in the
world (even more decentralized than the US) though the central government regulates almost every aspect of
local government finance. The same goes with Nigeria (7th position) although the states were really adminis-
trative outposts of the central government. 
4. Even with such an indicator, Rodden (2004) alerts us that ideally one should take into account the possibility
that central governments may restrict fiscal autonomy through formal limitations on borrowing (not only
through conditional grants and regulation of tax rate and base). 
5. All the test statistics mentioned in this paper but not reported directly are available upon request. 
6. Following Treisman (2002a) this refers to electoral decentralization and decision-making decentralization res-
pectively. 
7. This follows his earlier finding (2000) that federal countries are more likely to be corrupt (see also, Goldsmith,
1999 and Gerring and Thacker, 2004). 
8. We second here Rodden’s (2004) call to extend the OECD type methodology to a much wider set of countries,
especially developing ones, so as to better capture the importance of revenue mobilization when measuring the
impact of fiscal decentralization on different variables including government quality.
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En este artículo se analiza la relación entre descentralización fiscal y calidad de gobierno. Los resulta-
dos obtenidos a partir de una muestra de 29 países para el período 1984-1997, muestran que la descen-
tralización fiscal tiene efectos positivos sobre la calidad de las instituciones, aunque dicho efecto dis-
minuye  a  medida  que  aumenta  el  nivel  de  renta  del  país.  Además,  el  efecto  positivo  de  la
descentralización fiscal sobre la calidad de gobierno, en los países de renta media y baja se ve reduci-
do si ésta va acompañada de descentralización política; en cambio en los países ricos la descentraliza-
ción política mejora el impacto de la descentralización fiscal sobre la calidad de gobierno.
Palabras  clave: calidad  de  gobierno,  descentralización  fiscal,  descentralización  política,  datos  de
panel.
Clasificación JEL: H11, H77, K42.
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Description of the Variables
— Government Quality: Is the mean value of the ICRG variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order”
and “Bureaucracy”. Source: Quality of Government Institute at http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/.
— Fiscal Decentralization: All fiscal decentralization variables come from the Government Finance
Statistics of the IMF except the variable Tax Decentralization which comes from Stegarescu (2006). 
— Income:  Real  Gross  Domestic  Product  (RGDP)  per  capita.  Source:  World  Penn  Tables at
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
— Government size: Government Share of Real GDP. Source: World Penn Tables.
— Population: Total Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all
residents regardless of legal status or citizenship — except for refugees not permanently settled in
the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of ori-
gin. Source: World Penn Tables. 
— Democracy: One variable is an institutionalized democracy indicator on a scale from 0 to 10. It is
derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation,
the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.
Source: Variable DEMOC from Polity IV at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. Another variable
measuring democracy is the GASTIL INDEX which we employ as the average values of the politi-
cal rights and civil liberties indicators. Source: Freedom House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/.
— Checks and balances: Captures the number of veto players and whether or not these players are
competitively elected. Source: Variable CHECKS from Beck et al. (2001).
— Elections: Dummy variable. 0 if neither the regional executive nor the regional legislature are locally
elected, and 1 if either are elected. Source: Adapted from the variable STATE from Beck et al. (2001).
— Autonomy: Dummy variable where 1 represents residual and/or autonomy where residual means
that in the constitution subnational governments are given residual powers and autonomy means
that subnational legislatures have autonomy in certain specified areas not explicitly subject to cen-
tral laws. Source: Treisman (2002a).
— Legislative fractionalization: The probability that two deputies picked at random from the legisla-
ture will be of different parties. Source: Variable FRAC from Beck et al. (2001).
— Party age: This is the average of the age of the 1st and 2nd government parties and the 1st opposi-
tion party, or the subset of these for which age of the party is known. Source: Variable PARTY
AGE from Beck et al. (2001).
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Summary statistics
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Mean SD Min Max # of obs.
Government Quality 0.7626 0.2328 0.1111 1.0000 406
GDP per capita 11.640 6.854 1.013 29.956 406
Government Size (% GDP) 20.64 6.30 7.51 47.51 406
Subnational Expenditure (% GDP) 12.19 8.61 0.19 36.03 406
Subnational Expenditure (% total) 25.56 14.20 1.60 58.73 406
Subnational Revenue (% GDP) 7.25 5.89 0.07 23.99 406
Subnational Revenue (% total) 18.92 13.06 0.47 53.93 406
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